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ABSTRACT:  
Background: 
The Tobacco Industry (TI) can act to undermine the impact of tobacco tax increases by 
adopting various pricing strategies. Little is known about strategies used across the European 
Union (EU), except for the UK. 
Aims: 
To examine pricing strategies adopted by the TI in the EU, and whether they differ by cigarette 
price segment, or between manufactured and roll-your-own (RYO) cigarettes. 
Methods: 
A longitudinal analysis of commercial pricing data for manufactured and RYO cigarettes from 
23 EU countries, 2006-2017. Price and revenue trends were explored. Linear regression 
estimated the average annual change in revenue and linear fixed-effects panel regression 
models were used to explore the association between changes in median revenue (net of tax 
and adjusted for inflation) and tax increases in different price segments of manufactured 
cigarettes. 
Results: 
Over the 11-year period price gaps were observed in all countries. Average annual adjusted 
median net revenue per pack increased in 19 of 23 countries for manufactured and RYO 
cigarettes. A tax increase was associated with a significant decrease of -€0.09 in adjusted 
median net revenue per pack (95% Confidence Interval [CI] -0.16 to -0.03) in the cheap 
cigarette price segment, while no change was detected in the expensive cigarette price segment 
(-€0.05, 95% CI -0.11 to 0.01).  
Conclusion: 
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Across the EU, pricing strategies adopted by the TI maintained or increased price gaps and 
retained cheaper tobacco products in the market, diminishing the impacts of tobacco tax 
increases. Further strengthening of tobacco taxation policy is needed to maximise the public 
health impacts. 
 
 
  
 4 
INTRODUCTION 
Increasing the price of tobacco products by means of tax rises is among the most effective 
population-level tobacco control measures,1–3 and a cornerstone of the World Health 
Organization (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.4 The Tobacco Industry (TI) 
has long sought ways to influence tax policies and to undermine the effects of tax increases.5–
8 The European Union (EU), in Directive 2011/64/EU, has legislated on tobacco taxation, but 
only to stipulate the minimum level of excise duty that countries must impose.8  This Directive 
is currently being reviewed so it is important to understand how the TI has responded to its 
existing provisions.  
 
The TI can employ a range of measures to minimise the effects of tax rises on tobacco 
consumption. It can absorb the tax, thereby lowering its revenue (undershifting), pass it on in 
full through price increases commensurate to the tax increase, or overshift the tax, that is, raise 
prices above and beyond the tax increase thereby increasing revenue. It can take advantage of 
differing price elasticities of cheap and expensive products9; it can segment the market, thereby 
maintaining sales of cheap tobacco to price-sensitive consumers while increasing profits on 
more expensive products.5,6 There is evidence that the TI does employ these and other pricing 
strategies in several countries, with the most comprehensive studies conducted in the UK.5,6,10–
13 Such strategies undermine the public health objectives of tobacco tax increases as more 
smokers, particularly the poorest,14,15 are now consuming cheaper forms of manufactured or 
roll-your-own (RYO) cigarettes to maintain consumption.14–17 This is problematic as access to 
cheap tobacco appears to reduce motivation for, and success in, quitting smoking.18–21 
Evidence from Ireland demonstrates that while the industry may warn governments against 
raising taxes, citing multiple potential adverse outcomes secondary to price increases, 
companies consistently increase the prices they charge for some products to maximise profit.22 
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However, there is no comprehensive picture of the strategies employed by the TI across the 
EU, which could inform the review of the Directive. The prospect of new legislation provides 
an obvious window of opportunity to advance tobacco control.23,24  We have therefore 
undertaken a longitudinal analysis of EU country-specific pricing data on commercial cigarette 
and RYO tobacco products to ascertain changes over time in the context of tax increases, 
seeking evidence of tax undershifting or overshifting, and whether this varies across price 
segments and products. 
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METHODS 
We conducted a longitudinal analysis of TI pricing strategies using routinely collected 
commercial pricing and taxation data on both cigarette and RYO tobacco products sampled 
from 23 EU countries from 2006 to 2017. Ethical approval was therefore not required. 
 
Data sources 
Euromonitor Passport 
Euromonitor International is a market research company that publishes annual, country-
specific reports on tobacco markets.25 These include product pack size, brand and company, 
and prices in local currency. Sampling is designed to capture products that dominate the local 
market. Pricing data were available for cigarettes and RYO tobacco from 23 EU countries for 
years 2006-2017 (excluding Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta). Data were 
missing for 2007 from Belgium and 2006 from Slovakia. The initial dataset contained over 
40,000 tobacco product pricing observations.  
 
European Commission 
Tobacco excise duties for manufactured cigarettes and RYO tobacco were obtained for all 23 
EU countries and years included in the analysis from the European Commission’s 
Communication and Information Resource Centre for Administrators, Businesses and Citizens 
(CIRCABC).26  
 
Data 
Price standardisation and adjustment 
For comparison, prices were standardised to a 20-stick pack price for all cigarette and RYO 
tobacco products (referred to as manufactured and RYO cigarettes from here on).5,6,27 For RYO 
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cigarettes, one stick was assumed to contain 0.75g of tobacco, based on recent European  
data.5,28,29 Local currencies were converted into Euros using the historical exchange rates on 
the 1st of the month during which the data had been collected by Euromonitor, using data 
obtained from XE Corporation.30 Pack prices were adjusted for inflation using the Harmonised 
Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), compiled by Eurostat,31,32 and displayed in real terms using 
2015 as the reference year. 
Annual samples of <5 product price observations were removed. Thus, a total of 100 
manufactured (0.3%) and 138 RYO (2.0%) cigarette pricing observations were excluded from 
the analysis including all Romanian RYO data. 
 
Price segmentation 
Four approaches to divide products into cheap and expensive were identified in the literature: 
(1) extensive review of commercial literature,5,6,33 (2) division using quantiles,34,35 (3) using 
prices of market-dominant brands,11–13 or (4) a data-driven approach based on visual inspection 
of the price distribution.36 Given the number of countries and years (274 country-year samples), 
the feasibility of the quantile and data driven methods were assessed. 
 
We observed that pricing distributions, both within and between countries over time, assume 
many different shapes, precluding the visual data-driven approach. A quantile-based approach 
was therefore adopted to segment the data. Standardised 20-stick pack prices per year and 
country (in Euros) were arranged in ascending order and divided into quartiles. Products within 
the lower and upper quartiles (lower and upper 25th percentiles) were designated as cheap and 
expensive products, respectively. Segmentation of RYO cigarette pricing data was not 
undertaken as annual sample sizes were small.  
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Trends in manufactured and RYO cigarette pack prices 
The median 20-stick pack price of cheap, expensive and RYO cigarettes, adjusted for inflation, 
was calculated by year and country and analysed graphically. The median was used as the 
measure of price given the skewed nature of pricing data.37 Countries were divided into EU 
members prior to 2004 and those that joined afterwards.38  
 
Tax pass through 
Tobacco tax pass through, the extent to which companies shifted tobacco tax increases onto 
consumers through price increases or absorbed them by reducing profits, was assessed by 
calculating changes in median net revenue per pack of cheap, expensive and RYO cigarettes.5,6 
The median net revenue was calculated by subtracting the total tax paid per pack (specific, ad 
valorem and VAT), based on reported duties,26 from the median pack price (Supplementary 
methods). Median net revenue was adjusted for inflation and presented graphically by year and 
product for each country. Year-to-year changes in adjusted median net revenue were then 
calculated by segment and product for all countries for the period 2006-2017.5,6 If taxes are 
passed on fully to the consumer, the median net revenue should remain unchanged. A decrease 
in net revenue (negative change) suggests that the tax was (partially) absorbed by the company 
while an increase (positive change) implies overshifting of taxes, that is, the industry increased 
the price in excess of the tax increase.6 
 
Statistical analysis 
For each country, we used separate linear regression models to estimate average annual change 
in adjusted median net revenue for expensive, cheap or RYO cigarettes by regressing adjusted 
median net revenue on time. 
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A fixed-effects panel regression model was used separately for cheap and expensive cigarettes 
to explore the association between changes in adjusted median net revenue per 20-stick pack 
of manufactured cigarettes and tax increases. Panel regression models are an established 
method to analyse routinely collected data from multiple units over time, controlling for the 
clustering of observations within each country.27,39 The fixed-effects specification allowed us 
to control for unobserved time-invariant factors that may be associated with the independent 
variables at the level of the country, and was supported by the results of the Hausman 
specification test. The model estimated the association between the independent (tax increase) 
and outcome (net revenue per pack) variable within each country but not between-country 
associations. Tax increase was included as a binary variable classified as present if there was 
an increase of 0.5% in the reported total tax burden compared with the previous year. Tax 
burden is expressed as a percentage of the tax included retail selling price (TIRSP, 2006-2010) 
or weighted average price (WAP, 2011-2017).26 This threshold was adopted to exclude small 
increases in the recorded total tax burden potentially induced by non-tax changes, e.g. 
fluctuations in exchange rates. A sensitivity analysis with alternative thresholds of 1%, 2% and 
3%, was also undertaken. Changes in net revenue one year post a tax increase were estimated 
by including a 1-year time lag variable. This analysis was not undertaken for RYO cigarettes 
as: (1) small sample sizes precluded segmentation and (2) total tax burden as a percent of the 
TIRSP/WAP is not reported for RYO tobacco. Data were analysed using Microsoft Excel and 
Stata/IC15.1.40 The full regression models are available in the supplementary material.  
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RESULTS 
Price segmentation 
Pricing data were available for 34,107 manufactured cigarette and 6,963 RYO tobacco products 
from 23 EU countries in the period 2006-2017 (Supplementary Tables 1&2). All pricing 
distributions were separated into unique quartiles, except for data collected in 2008 for 
Denmark and 2016 for Romania as there was no price differentiation above the lowest quartile.  
 
Analysis of pricing 
Trends in adjusted median price of expensive and cheap cigarettes and RYO cigarettes are 
shown in Figures 1A&B. The adjusted median price of a 20-pack of expensive cigarettes 
ranged from €1.64 (Romania) to €13.46 (UK) in 2006 and from €3.07 (Bulgaria) to €12.89 
(Ireland) in 2017. The adjusted median price of a 20-pack equivalent of RYO cigarettes ranged 
from €0.79 (Hungary) to €5.03 (UK) in 2006 and from €1.57 (Hungary) to €7.99 (Ireland) in 
2017. The largest median difference, €4.56 (range €2.91 to €8.42), was observed in the UK, 
between expensive and RYO segments, and the lowest was observed in Bulgaria, between 
cheap manufactured and RYO cigarettes, €0.01 (range -€0.29 to €0.43).  
 
Tobacco products were consistently cheaper in the post-2004 than pre-2004 countries, typically 
costing below €4.00 per pack. Prices increased gradually in most countries over the study 
period. This was also true when trends were measured using local currency (Supplementary 
Material)..  
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Tax pass through 
Tax policy  
During the period of analysis, all countries changed tobacco taxation for both manufactured 
cigarette and RYO tobacco (Supplementary Figures 3-5). In most, there were both increases 
in, and adjustments to, tax components, although their scale and nature varied.  
 
Analysis of changes in net revenue 
In all countries, and in all years, the adjusted median net revenue for a 20-pack of expensive 
manufactured cigarettes remained above that for cheap and RYO cigarettes in all pre-2004 
countries (Figure 2A&B). The adjusted median net revenue was higher for cheap manufactured 
cigarettes compared to RYO cigarettes in 9 of the 13 pre-2004 countries throughout the study 
period. In 5 of the 9 post-2004 countries for which RYO data were included, the adjusted 
median net revenue was greater than that for cheap manufactured cigarettes in most years. In 
Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania the adjusted median net revenue obtained from a 20-stick pack 
of RYO cigarettes was greater than that for expensive manufactured cigarettes in most years, 
the difference ranging from -€0.09 to €0.44, -€0.18 to €0.40 and -€0.04 to €0.37 respectively.  
As noted above, tax-shifting was assessed by calculating the year-on-year changes in adjusted 
median net revenue (Supplementary Tables 3&4). Evidence of overshifting (positive change) 
and/or undershifting (negative change) could be seen in all countries.   
 
The average annual change in median net revenue for manufactured and RYO cigarettes was 
positive in the majority of countries over the period 2006-2017 (Table 1). There were positive 
changes for expensive and RYO cigarettes in 9 of 10 pre-2004 countries and in 3 of 5 for cheap 
cigarettes, while changes were all positive in post-2004 countries. In the post-2004 countries, 
significant annual increases in median net revenue were more common with cheap 
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manufactured cigarettes than with expensive manufactured and RYO cigarettes. In contrast, in 
pre-2004 countries, statistically significant increases were more common with expensive 
manufactured cigarettes.  
 
We then used linear fixed-effects panel regression analysis to ascertain the consequences of a 
tax increase (0.5%) on adjusted median net revenue of cigarettes. There was a significant 
reduction of -€0.09 in revenue per pack from cheap manufactured cigarettes (95% Confidence 
Interval [CI] -0.16 to -0.03) in years when tax increases were observed (Table 2). There was 
no statistically significant change with expensive cigarettes (-€0.05, 95% CI -0.11 to 0.01). A 
sensitivity analysis using different thresholds, 1%, 2% or 3%, produced consistent findings 
(Supplementary Table 5). While a reduction in adjusted median net revenue was observed in 
the year following a tax increase, this decrease was not statistically significant using a threshold 
of 0.5%. However, a significant reduction in adjusted median net revenue for the cheap 
segment 1-year post tax increase was observed when using thresholds of 1%, 2% and 3%. No 
significant association between adjusted median net revenue and tax increase was observed for 
the expensive segment.  
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Table 1: Linear regression analysis of the estimated annual change in adjusted median net revenue for 
manufactured and RYO cigarettes over the period 2006 to 2017 in all countries grouped by year of EU 
accession. 
Country Estimated average annual change in adjusted median net revenue, € 
Pre-2004 Expensive: ß (95 % CI) Cheap: ß (95 % CI) RYO: ß (95 % CI) 
Belgium† 0.035* (0.018 to 0.053) 0.015 (-0.002 to 0.033) 0.015* (0.002 to 0.029) 
Denmark 0.023 (-0.057 to 0.103) -0.033 (-0.111 to 0.044) 0.023* (0.003 to 0.044) 
Finland† -0.014* (-0.027 to -0.001) -0.001 (-0.01 to 0.008) -0.016* (-0.026 to -0.005) 
France† 0.038* (0.015 to 0.06) 0.042* (0.021 to 0.063) 0.064* (0.038 to 0.09) 
Germany 0.049* (0.029 to 0.07) 0.064* (0.048 to 0.079) 0.034* (0.008 to 0.059) 
Greece 0.026 (-0.016 to 0.067) -0.001 (-0.022 to 0.02) -0.002 (-0.019 to 0.014) 
Ireland 0.145* (0.101 to 0.189) 0.038 (0 to 0.077) 0.08* (0.039 to 0.121) 
Italy 0.017* (0.014 to 0.02) 0.005 (-0.003 to 0.013) 0.024* (0.019 to 0.029) 
Netherlands 0.081* (0.044 to 0.119) 0.044 (-0.008 to 0.096) 0.030* (0.001 to 0.058) 
Portugal 0.072* (0.053 to 0.091) 0.051* (0.03 to 0.072) 0.039 (-0.015 to 0.092) 
Spain† 0.044* (0.031 to 0.057) 0.043* (0.03 to 0.056) 0.042* (0.014 to 0.07) 
Sweden 0.053* (0.013 to 0.092) -0.056* (-0.097 to -0.015) 0.094 (-0.011 to 0.2) 
United Kingdom 0.098 (-0.104 to 0.3) 0.084 (-0.028 to 0.196) 0.121* (0.056 to 0.187) 
    
Post-2004       
    
Bulgaria† 0.024 (-0.016 to 0.063) 0.014 (-0.022 to 0.05) 0.023* (0.003 to 0.044) 
Czech Republic 0.005 (-0.018 to 0.028) 0.04* (0.029 to 0.051) -0.028 (-0.057 to 0.001) 
Estonia 0.022 (-0.02 to 0.064) 0.022 (-0.005 to 0.048) 0.012 (-0.024 to 0.049) 
Hungary 0.005 (-0.022 to 0.032) 0.043* (0.016 to 0.071) 0.016* (0.005 to 0.026) 
Latvia† 0.023* (0.003 to 0.042) 0.043* (0.027 to 0.060) 0.035 (-0.005 to 0.075) 
Lithuania† 0.002 (-0.031 to 0.035) 0.036* (0.015 to 0.058) 0.048* (0.027 to 0.069) 
Poland 0.037* (0.016 to 0.057) 0.039* (0.023 to 0.056) 0.016 (-0.009 to 0.04) 
Romania§ 0.102* (0.045 to 0.159) 0.083* (0.046 to 0.12) - 
Slovakia† 0.007 (-0.017 to 0.031) 0.035* (0.007 to 0.062) 0.107* (0.068 to 0.146) 
Slovenia 0.029* (0.023 to 0.035) 0.012* (0.004 to 0.019) -0.008 (-0.022 to 0.006) 
    
† Less than 12 annual data points available for the analysis  
* Statistically significant 
§ RYO data not used due to small (<5) annual sample sizes 
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Table 2: Association between tax increase and change in adjusted median net revenue (€) estimated 
using linear fixed-effects panel regression models. 
Price segment Tax increase β P value 95 % CI 
     
Cheap Within year -0.09 0.003 -0.16 to -0.03 
 1-year lag -0.05 0.106 -0.11 to 0.01 
     
Expensive Within year -0.05 0.106 -0.11 to 0.01 
 1-year lag -0.01 0.823 -0.09 to 0.07 
Note: Regression analyses were performed separately for each cigarette price segment. Pricing data were not available for every 
year in all countries (see methods for details). 
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DISCUSSION 
Our findings suggest that across 23 EU countries, between 2006 and 2017, tax increases were 
selectively undershifted in the cheap segment of the cigarette market and there was exploitation 
of the low tax rate imposed on RYO tobacco. This likely maintained availability of cheap forms 
of tobacco while realising increases in revenue.  
 
Throughout the study period, a range of prices was observed, with comparatively cheaper 
tobacco products being present in all markets in the form of cheaper manufactured and/or RYO 
cigarettes. Although tax increases were imposed on RYO tobacco, the price of RYO cigarettes 
was consistently below that of expensive cigarettes in all 23 countries, with a price gap between 
expensive and cheap cigarettes also seen in most years. This suggests that smokers had the 
opportunity to downtrade to a cheaper form of tobacco in the face of tax increases, as observed 
in previous UK studies,5,6 thereby negating the potential impact on consumption. This is in 
agreement with studies in the EU, and elsewhere, demonstrating ongoing availability, and 
increasing use of, relatively cheap forms of tobacco, factors known to undermine cessation 
efforts.16,20,21,41 In this way, cheap and RYO cigarettes serve as substitutes for more expensive 
products,42–45 a phenomenon supported by the large price gap between manufactured and RYO 
cigarettes across many countries,31 and the country-level analyses presented here.  
 
In the majority of countries, the annual average change in adjusted net revenue for a pack of 
expensive, cheap and RYO cigarettes was estimated to be positive, demonstrating that while 
overall consumption of cigarettes, particularly premium brands, is declining, differential 
shifting of taxes and rising consumption of cheaper forms of tobacco, such as RYO, increase 
industry revenue and presumably profits.5,6 Interestingly, among post-2004 countries the 
number of significant increases in revenue was greatest in the cheap cigarette segment, while 
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this was observed in the expensive cigarette price segment among pre-2004 countries. This 
may reflect how Trans-national Tobacco Companies (TTCs) lobby for policies that favour the 
sale of international premium brands in Eastern European countries, but promote cheaper 
products through static prices and price promotions in countries with high tobacco taxes and 
strict tobacco control, such as the UK.5–7,46,47 In addition, the observed net revenue obtained 
from RYO cigarettes was, in some countries, greater than with manufactured cigarettes, both 
cheap and, in some cases, expensive. This may reflect exploitation by the industry of the 
differential taxation systems imposed on manufactured versus RYO cigarettes, as has been 
reported recently in the UK and Spain.8,29,48  
 
The regression analysis provided an overview of the patterns of change. Following tax 
increases, revenue from cheap cigarettes fell but there was no change with expensive cigarettes. 
Put another way, the TI absorbed tax increases on cheaper cigarettes, to ensure that they 
remained affordable, but passed tax increases on to expensive cigarettes. Two previous studies 
revealed varying patterns of tax-shifting across Europe38,49 but both looked at the overall 
cigarette market, rather than price segments within it, using the most popular price category (a 
measure subsequently shown to reflect premium product prices6,48) and one was performed 
before enlargement of the EU and market consolidation.49 A Ukraine-based study suggested 
that, when analysing the cigarette market as a whole, lower tax increases were absorbed but 
larger ones were overshifted.50 Our findings suggest that undershifting of taxes was observed 
in the cheap segment of the manufactured cigarette market, regardless of the magnitude of tax 
increase included in the model. By analysing differential use of tax-shifting among price 
segments, this study adds to evidence from previous studies and, in combination with UK-
based analyses,5,6 establishes the importance of studying the impacts of taxes by price segment 
and product. 
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To our knowledge, this is the first study using a fixed-effects panel regression model with data 
from multiple time points and countries to measure the association between tax and revenue 
changes across the EU, while controlling for the clustering of the within-country observations 
as well as regional and unobserved time-invariant factors, potentially associated with tax 
changes. As TI responses to tax increases could plausibly vary with the timing of a tax increase 
relative to previous increases, or in anticipation of future taxes, time may explain, in part, any 
association between tax and revenue changes. Consequently, we did not include time in our 
model. It is possible that our findings could differ if we had looked only at individual countries 
but this would have reduced statistical power. However, as four TTCs dominate the EU 
market,51 it is reasonable to estimate strength of association across the region as a whole.  
 
This study has several limitations. The nature of our data precluded analysis using industry-
defined price segments, i.e., use of ultra-low, discount, mid-range and premium, limiting 
comparability with other studies.5,6 However, our data source has the advantage of size, 
permitting analysis of trends in price and revenue of manufactured and RYO cigarettes at 
country level over an 11-year period. Our use of quartiles can be justified as being data driven. 
Second, Euromonitor International data are intended predominantly for commercial use and do 
not include some parameters such as price promotions that may reduce price. However, given 
how price promotions tend to be concentrated in the cheap segment of the market,5 their 
omission is likely to have underestimated the price differentials we found. Standardisation of 
pack sizes may similarly have led to an underestimate of the real-world price gap between 
cheap and expensive pack prices.5 On the other hand, as the data reflect retail prices they are 
not influenced by recall or rounding biases introduced by self-reporting of prices.52,53 
Importantly, prior studies support the use of commercial data in public health research.27,54,55 
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Additionally, the data are collected annually, so we could not analyse changes on a month-by-
month scale. Studies in the UK and South Africa revealed undershifting immediately after tax 
increases with subsequent recovery and an increase in revenue through overshifting later in the 
year.5,10 We could also not segment the RYO price distributions, limiting the analysis of 
differential tax-shifting to manufactured cigarettes. We also assumed an average weight of 
0.75g for RYO cigarettes, although variation has been documented in reported weights between 
EU countries.28 Finally, we could not assess changes in market share or shifts in individual 
choice of brands, and nor could we take account of illicit tobacco products, although this 
comprises a small share of the EU market, contrary to what might be assumed given the 
strenuous efforts by the TI to exaggerate it as part of their argument against tax rises.8,16,56 
Similarly, we could not assess affordability, so price increases might not reduce affordability.38 
These limitations are, however, unlikely to explain fully the key findings of our analysis.  
 
Research and Policy implications 
Further research is needed, in particular of pricing strategies adopted at national or regional 
level, incorporating data on price promotions and measures of consumption and affordability. 
Other research could explore pricing strategies adopted in response to changes in the various 
elements of tobacco tax to assess whether these vary by price segment and tobacco product. 
 
Complementing previous UK-based analyses, the evidence presented here points to TI pricing 
strategies that potentially undermined the public health objectives of tobacco taxes. As EU 
Directive 2011/64/EU is currently under review,31 there is a window of opportunity to address 
this issue.31 As called for by other researchers, there is a need for more sophisticated measures 
to support price increases and to reduce price gaps, and to understand and address TI strategies 
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designed to undermine tax increases. Such measures may include adoption of a larger specific 
excise tax element,57 delivering larger and unannounced tax increases, and increasing taxation 
of RYO tobacco.5,8,31 Furthermore, non-tax pricing strategies, such as the adoption of minimum 
markup/price laws, an effective method of increasing prices of the cheapest cigarettes, should 
be considered and may serve to complement tax-based policies.58–60  
 
The study has implications for tax design and implementation in other regions that are seeking 
to strengthen tobacco control and for those considering taxes on other products harmful to 
health, such as products of the alcohol and sugar-sweetened beverage industries, which have 
adopted similar strategies to that of the TI to maintain consumption and influence policy.61–63  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study extends previous research in the UK, providing evidence to suggest that the TI 
adopts pricing strategies that reduce the impact of tobacco tax increases in EU countries by 
maintaining the availability of cheaper forms of tobacco. Such activities serve to jeopardise 
public health gains and exacerbate smoking-related inequalities. We provide further evidence 
of the need for strengthening, and ongoing evaluation of, tobacco taxation policy and delivery, 
to achieve the public health objective of tobacco taxation.  
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WHAT THIS PAPER ADDS: 
What is already known on this subject: 
 
 Comprehensive UK-based studies show that the Tobacco Industry (TI) adopts pricing 
strategies that undermine the public health impacts of tobacco taxes. 
 Across the EU, there are large differences in prices of manufactured cigarettes and RYO 
tobacco products. 
 
What important gaps in knowledge exist on this topic: 
 
 Little is known about contemporary use of pricing strategies by the TI across the EU, 
even though this information is important to inform current revisions to tobacco tax 
legislation. 
 Analyses of price differentials in tobacco markets across the EU are lacking. 
What this paper adds: 
 
 The pricing strategies adopted by the TI potentially undermine the impact of tobacco 
taxes across the EU by retaining cheaper forms of tobacco in the market. 
 The TI appears to absorb tax increases differentially between cigarette prices segments 
thereby maintaining cheaper manufactured cigarettes in the EU market.  
 The current revision to the EU tobacco tax Directive offers scope for advancing public 
health objectives. 
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Figure 1: Adjusted median 20-stick pack price for manufactured and RYO cigarettes from 
2006 to 2017 in countries who (A) joined the EU prior to 2004 (B) countries who joined the 
EU after 2004.  
* Note the use of different scales for Ireland and the United Kingdom. 
Note: Prices were adjusted for inflation using the HICP and pack sizes were standardised to 20 sticks. Non-Euro prices have 
been converted to Euros using historical exchange rates. Pricing data was not available for every year in all countries (see 
methods for details). 
Figure 2: Adjusted median net revenue for manufactured and RYO cigarettes from 2006 to 
2017 in countries who (A) joined the EU prior to 2004 and (B) joined the EU post 2004. 
* Note, different scales used for Ireland and the United Kingdom. 
Note: Revenue was adjusted for inflation using the HICP. All results are shown in Euros. Pricing data was not available for 
every year in all countries (see methods for details).
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